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Abstract.  Because of their leverage over employees, corporate 
managers are prime targets for incentives to control corporate 
crime, even when managers do not themselves commit crimes.  
Moreover, the collective actions of corporate management—
producing what is sometimes referred to as corporate culture—
can be the cause of corporate crime, not just a locus of the failure 
to control it.  Because civil liability and private compensation 
arrangements have limited effects on management behavior—
and because the problem is, after all, crime—criminal law is 
often expected to intervene.  This chapter offers a functional 
explanation for corporate criminal liability:  individual criminal 
liability cannot effectively address the relationship between 
senior managers and corporate crime but corporate criminal 
liability can, at least in part.  Thus the practice of corporate 
criminal liability has grown and will continue to do so, at least in 





Few would disagree that malfeasance committed within large corporations can 
inflict outsized harms on the public; that it occurs within complex, diverse, and 
often opaque institutional contexts; and, therefore, that it calls for particularized 
and determined regulatory responses. 
 
Most who have thought about this problem would concede that the role of 
corporate managers is a central point of intervention for law:  a locus to which 
wrongdoing often can be traced and where deterrent messages can achieve 
leverage given that managers wield disproportionate power within firms.  
American corporate law, regimes of securities regulation, and many other systems 
of regulation designed with the corporation in mind proceed from these premises.  
This point about directing incentives towards corporate managers is only more 
important, while also trickier to get right, when managers do not personally 
commit the relevant delicts—a scenario that has been repeating in very large 
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firms, particularly those that are publicly traded and operated under complex and 
layered governance and compensation regimes. 
 
Furthermore, when corporate malfeasance implicates arguments about 
criminal punishment—either because the wrongdoing is plainly criminal 
according to existing legal definitions, or because reformers might call for using 
the special potency of criminal sanctions—the role of managers can present a 
particular problem.  Especially in the repeating systemic breakdowns of recent 
years, corporate managers often bear serious responsibility for what happened but 
were not involved in crime, either as direct perpetrators or as fully complicit 
accomplices or conspirators.  Conventional legal doctrines, for good reasons, do 
not authorize personal criminal sanctions.  Some special doctrines of supervisory 
criminal liability exist but they are controversial and, to date, have been narrowly 
tailored.  
 
The law, of course, has other tools available for influencing management 
behavior, both directly and indirectly.  Only one of those tools, however, can 
claim the label “criminal” and can mobilize a criminal justice process with all that 
entails, including the core idea of punishment.  That tool is corporate criminal 
liability.  It is criminal.  It is a form of punishment.  And it is directed, in 
important part, towards managers of firms.  Or so this chapter will suggest. 
 
The argument that follows is not intended as a knock down case in favor of 
corporate criminal liability.  The literature on that question is beyond voluminous 
and I am guilty of having contributed to the overweight (DiMento et al. 2000, 
Buell 2006, 2016). Suffice it to say that no conclusive argument has been 
recorded for or against corporate criminal liability and none is likely to be 
discovered in the short term. 
 
The objective here is to identify one underappreciated benefit of corporate 
criminal liability, and to make a modest normative claim from there.  Crucial to 
any understanding of corporate criminal liability is recognizing that, as currently 
practiced in the United States, the doctrine and its enforcement have developed 
organically—largely through the collective and incremental practices of 
enforcement authorities and the bar—to fill a gap between criminal law and 
corporate regulation. 
 
Understanding the nature of this gap, and the reasons for it, is essential to 
giving corporate criminal liability its due, something it has not always received in 
recent commentary.  The doctrine’s tenacity and its growth in practice can be 
understood as a natural response to the problem of how to influence, and even 
punish, corporate managers in relation to corporate crime. 
 
The modest normative extension of this point will be to say that corporate 
criminal liability might be a second-best measure for dealing with management 
responsibility for corporate crime, given that individual criminal liability comes 
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up short.  This claim does not come close to settling the debate over corporate 
criminal liability in the United States.  It is riddled with empirical uncertainties, as 
are competing claims.  Arguments holding that forms of civil liability could fill 
the gap just as well, at least if one could redesign regulatory systems from scratch, 
remain plausible. 
 
But the current legal landscape should be taken as evidence for something 
about the function of corporate criminal liability.  It also must be accepted as the 
context in which the law will manage the next fiasco of corporate malfeasance 
that arises today or tomorrow. 
 
Corporate criminal liability is a useful existing tool for responding to the 
problem of what might be called criminally bad management.  To show this, 
Section 2 will describe the problem, mostly by way of examples; Section 3 will 
describe the demand for criminal liability and punishment in the corporate 
context; Section 4 will explain the limitations of individual criminal liability in 
satisfying that demand; and Section 5 will show how corporate criminal liability 
fills the gap.  
 
2. The Nature of the Problem 
 
 2.1 MANAGEMENT FAILURE AND CORPORATE CRIME 
 
In a great many of the recent cases of corporate malfeasance that have worried 
both the American public and those who work in legal institutions, the facts could 
not speak more clearly to the responsibility of management for damaging acts of 
misconduct committed by mid and lower-level employees.  Managers of the 
companies embroiled in these scandals struck the wrong balance, to say the least, 
between quarterly earnings and compliance—between corporate offense and 
defense—with disastrous and, in hindsight, predictable results.  Yet in nearly all 
of these cases it is equally clear that senior managers committed no serious crimes 
themselves—at least in the sense of having violated the terms of American 
criminal prohibitions, even if they might have done things the public would 
understandably want to call “criminal.” 
 
There is a clear relationship between corporate management, indeed bad 
corporate management, and corporate crime.  It is a relationship that arises from 
the nature of the large, complex institution, especially the for-profit firm.  It is not 
one, however, within the boundaries of conventional concepts of criminal 
liability. 
 
Economic analysis of corporate regulation has usually understood this 
relationship as having to do with management not preventing corporate crime—as 
a failure of internal or private policing (Arlen and Kraakman 1997, Kornhauser 
1982, Sykes 1984).  This is what is encompassed by the common and now banal 
terminology of “compliance” (Miller 2014, Baer 2009). 
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This understanding is incomplete.  In many scandals of corporate 
malfeasance, especially the ones that worry the public the most, the failure of 
management is not just a failure to prevent crime.  It also includes complicity—
and therefore desert of blame—in the production or fostering or tolerance of a 
corporate environment that was, to borrow a term in vogue with street crime, 
criminogenic (Laufer 1994).  Managers did not just fail to constrain the natural 
impulse in the corporate context to violate the law for profit.  They helped it 
along. 
 
This perspective brings into the analysis of corporate wrongdoing the 
notoriously elusive concept of “corporate culture” (Bucy 1990).  Culture eludes 
theorizing because it is complex, diverse, and deeply contingent on fact.  There 
can be no dispute, however, that culture is real and that corporate managers bear 
responsibility for it. 
 
 2.2 CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES 
 
The relationship of managers to corporate crime can be seen more clearly 
through examples.  Consider four recent ones. 
 
 2.2.1. BP 
 
On April 20, 2010, BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig exploded in the Gulf of 
Mexico, killing eleven people and releasing millions of barrels of crude oil into 
one of the world’s most economically important ecosystems.1  If professional 
criminals—terrorists perhaps—had done this awful deed, the story about how the 
disaster was caused and who should be held responsible would have been 
straightforward.  But because a corporation did it, explanation and accountability 
were complex, at the levels of both actions and mental state.  (The less precise 
term “culpability” might be better than mental state since, for purposes of 
institutional responsibility, the question is how to describe the collective decision 
making of all the relevant actors within the corporation, and corporations of 
course do not have states of mind.) 
 
The best explanation for the BP affair combines immediate events with more 
gradual developments.  The rig exploded when the men in charge of temporarily 
capping the well failed to call ashore for help though all signs pointed to an 
impending and disastrous failure.  The events were not brought under control 
much earlier because BP did not do enough as an organization, in the Gulf or 
elsewhere, to prioritize accident prevention while pursuing an aggressive 
corporate strategy to find larger and deeper offshore oil deposits. 
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Nov. 14, 2012) (criminal information, plea agreement, and sentencing order); United States v. 
Kaluza, Crim. No. 12-265 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2012) (superseding indictment). 
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Robert Kaluza and Donald Vidrine are not at the center of the public’s 
understanding of the BP case, even though they were the two BP employees 
federal prosecutors said were responsible for failing to alert others to the 
escalating problem at the well.  Kaluza and Vidrine were charged with 
manslaughter.  A third BP employee, David Rainey, was indicted for obstruction 
of justice for concealing information after the accident about how much oil was 
flowing out of the well site on the floor of the Gulf. 
 
Few people closely followed the prosecutions of these men, which became 
tied up in pretrial wrangling in federal court.  That wrangling produced a victory 
for Kaluza and Vidrine, who persuaded the Fifth Circuit to affirm the trial court’s 
dismissal of the maritime manslaughter charges on the ground that the federal 
statute does not apply to persons whose job on a vessel does not relate to 
navigating the craft.2  (This ruling was poor statutory interpretation deployed in a 
bad cause.  But that is another topic.)  In the end, Vidrine pled guilty to violating 
the Clean Water Act, Kaluza was acquitted of the same charge after a trial, and 
another jury acquitted Rainey of the obstruction charges. 
 
More was at stake in this case.  Observers of the BP affair rationally placed 
responsibility on the corporations—primarily BP—that owned the rig, drilled the 
well, profited from the enterprise, hired and trained the workers, made the critical 
decisions and policies about equipment and safety, and so on.  Yet the trouble 
with blaming BP’s managers is that, as in many cases of corporate crime, it is 
difficult to pinpoint who within the massive, bureaucratic global organization that 
is BP both knew enough and was in charge enough to be the correct target for 
blame for the Gulf spill. 
 
This is more than a lawyer’s problem, a mere difficulty of proof.  It is a 
problem of responsibility and blame.  The higher you go in BP, the more 
responsible the managers seem to be.  (Remember how the world felt about 
former CEO Tony Hayward in the spring of 2010 when BP’s well was dumping 
oil and he said he wanted “his life back”?)  But responsibility does not easily 
translate into liability.  The higher you go in BP, the less the managers knew and 
were involved day to day in the specific problem of the Deep Horizon rig.  As one 
ascends the corporate ladder, the case for responsibility becomes more and more 
“you did a bad job of setting responsible priorities and preventing crime” and less 
and less “you took the following act or decision that triggered that terrible 
explosion and spill.”  Yet criminal liability usually requires just such an act. 
 
 2.2.2. GM 
 
The case of the scandalous deaths of drivers of General Motors cars involves 
an even deeper thicket of causation and responsibility within a massive corporate 
organization (Valukas 2014).  Years of engineering designs and redesigns, 
accident reports and reconstructions, litigation teams, and endless meetings, 
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documentation efforts, and corporate reporting chains reduce to a stunningly 
simple problem.  The spring mechanism in the starter GM installed in some car 
models—the place where the key goes in—was not strong enough.  When drivers 
knocked a leg into a key chain that had heavy doodads on it, the starter could 
rotate out of the run position, causing the engine to turn off and preventing the air 
bag from deploying, with disastrous consequences for those in the car.  To date, it 
appears that 124 people likely died when a leg jostled a key chain in the wrong 
way at the wrong time.3 
 
It is bad enough that GM would design and use a faulty starter switch when 
making a properly functioning one would have been so easy.  It is much worse 
that GM’s managers failed to identify this simple problem and fix it in the face of 
nearly nine years of lawsuits and mounting evidence that GM’s cars were 
spontaneously shutting down on the road.  All the while, they were managing a 
gigantic firm, one in the business of making America’s most lethal consumer 
product, whose employees joked about how meetings predictably ended with the 
“GM nod” (meaning “someone should do something about that”) or the “GM 
salute” (in which one crosses arms pointing to the persons to one’s left and to 
one’s right as the responsible parties). 
 
There is one traditional villain in the GM story.  An engineer responsible for 
the switch corrected the design—no doubt after realizing the problem, though he 
incredibly claims to have forgotten the whole thing.  Yet he did not document the 
change or the reason it was needed, as required by company policy.  The 
engineer’s concealment suppressed what would have been a red flag, thus keeping 
GM lawyers and investigators off the trail of the bad starter switch and greatly 
prolonging the problem. 
 
But many others at GM were responsible for the fatally flawed switch and 
GM’s failure to discover and act on the cause of all the deadly accidents.  Those 
responsible included numerous lawyers at the company who tracked the relevant 
lawsuits as well as senior managers at GM who presided over an organization in 
which such a major problem could develop over such a long time without anyone 
thinking to raise the alarm with top executives.  Even the General Counsel was 
not told.  
 
Assume for the sake of argument—there is certainly one to be made—that 
what was done at GM that killed those drivers deserves, generally speaking, to be 
treated as a crime.  Who is the criminal at GM?  One could perhaps imagine that, 
with more facts, there might be a legal theory on which to prosecute the engineer 
who concealed the change in switch design.  But that would hardly seem like an 
appropriate end to the matter at GM—just as prosecuting the rig engineers alone 
at BP would not have been an adequate response to the Gulf spill. 
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One can go up the management chain at GM, just as one could at BP, but the 
problem at GM, even more than at BP, is one of “you should have been a better 
corporate manager, your communication channels were lousy.”  When it comes to 
the approach to safety that resulted in deaths, the culpability of GM senior 
managers, even more than for BP’s top executives, is for sins of omission rather 
than commission. 
 
 2.2.3. JP Morgan 
 
Then there is the case of the group of traders at JP Morgan that included 
Bruno Iksil, who became known as the “London Whale.” 4   Those traders 
managed a profitable book of derivative securities that earned the bank as much 
as $1 billion annually.  Like all successful traders in the highly competitive 
investment banking industry, they were well compensated with bonuses tied to the 
profits they generated for the bank. 
 
When the market for their products turned rather suddenly against them in 
2012, the traders knew they had a large quantity of securities on their books that 
should be marked down—in an amount that later resulted in nearly a billion dollar 
loss on JP Morgan’s publicly reported financial statements.  Instead of reporting 
the truth about the plummeting value of their books internally within the bank, 
and thus ultimately to shareholders and the public, the key players in this trading 
group lied—no doubt justifying their actions with the tried and true mentality of 
the fraud perpetrator that the market would turn around and no one would need to 
be the wiser. 
 
Investors in JP Morgan were victims of fraud because, to the tune of nearly $1 
billion, the bank gave them false information about the value of its portfolio.  
Senior managers at JP Morgan approved that information and its release.  They 
also approved the compensation system that can fairly be said to have caused the 
traders in London to take big risks and then lie when their risks went bad.  
Managers also were responsible for reporting and compliance systems within the 
bank that did not include a means of preventing the traders from controlling how 
the bank valued the London derivatives book in its overall financials.  But, as far 
as public evidence shows, the top managers at JP Morgan did not know that the 
numbers from the usually legitimately profitable group in London had turned 
massively false. 
 
Iksil earned a nonprosecution agreement and stood ready to testify against his 
boss Javier Martin-Artajo.  Martin-Artajo’s London group primarily traded credit 
default swaps in a “synthetic credit portfolio.”  Prosecutors in the Southern 
District of New York must have believed that a jury would see Iksil, whale-sized 
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trading book or not, as a junior minion who did the bidding of an overbearingly 
aggressive manager. 
 
Martin-Artajo, whom the government alleges brushed away a compliance 
employee at the bank with, “I’m a trader, I do not mark the books to U.S. GAAP, 
my job is to manage risk,” went to Spain.  There he will likely remain, having 
somehow persuaded a Spanish court to deny American prosecutors’ request that 
he be extradited to New York to be tried on charges of securities fraud.5  No one 
above Martin-Artajo at JP Morgan has been charged in this large, familiar, and 
predictable instance of accounting fraud in the marking of derivatives books by 
bonus-incentivized traders. 
 
Do not expect such charges.  Managers offering steep bonuses for profitable 
books and then inadequately monitoring those books is not, at least in the absence 
of proof of knowledge of serious red flags, criminal.  The bank itself settled 
civilly with the SEC, not the Justice Department.  This was one of the SEC’s 
recent enforcement deals in which admissions of wrongdoing are required as a 
price of settlement.  The facts admitted by JP Morgan in the SEC settlement 
consist of a scolding of New York management and the firm’s Audit Committee 
for failing to implement adequate controls on the bank’s trading books and having 
sclerosis in the reporting channels that led up to senior management.  (Note that it 
was in 2012—years after the worst problems of the investment banking industry 
came to light—that these management and control deficits enabled the fiasco of 
the London Whale.6) 
 
 2.2.4. Walmart 
 
As a last example, consider Walmart.  The retailing behemoth is reported to 
be in the process of negotiating a resolution with the U.S. Department of Justice 
over violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits bribing 
foreign officials for business purposes.  The core of the scandal involves 
revelations that Walmart operatives in Mexico paid numerous bribes to speed the 
approval process for constructing new stores in that country, which at the time 
was Walmart’s fastest area of growth in the world (Barstow 2012).  The bribery 
was a result of Walmart’s relentlessly expansionist business model and its lack of 
effective controls on the employees driving that expansion in foreign countries. 
 
Walmart’s legal troubles have been made worse by a culture of denial and 
insularity at its corporate headquarters that caused Walmart to minimize and fail 
to pursue information about bribery in Mexico appropriately when the problem 
first surfaced through an internal whistleblower.  Perhaps that pathology of denial 
related to Walmart’s famously successful obsession with cost cutting.  A 
                                                      
5 Spain:  Court Rejects Extradition of JP Morgan Trader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2015. 
6 If space permitted and the point about management responsibility for corporate crime needed 
further illustration, the major scandal in 2016 in which the bank Wells Fargo fired 5,300 
employees for creating millions of fraudulent customer accounts would fit here just as well. 
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prestigious national law firm initially recommended to corporate managers that 
they commission an expensive outside investigation of the company’s Mexico 
operations.  Walmart management rejected this advice, choosing wishful thinking 
(and an internal investigation by the division allegedly responsible for the 
problem) over steep legal bills.  The cost of Walmart’s FCPA sanctions is likely 
to be much higher because of this decision. 
 
More will be learned about the facts of the Walmart case when it is inevitably 
settled in expensive enforcement actions. 7   Based on currently available 
information, however, it has not been established that any senior Walmart 
manager in the United States knew of the bribery while it was going on.  There is 
serious senior management responsibility for what happened at Walmart—both in 
terms of the incentives and controls in Mexico and in terms of the company’s 
initial response to allegations of criminality.  But that responsibility is unlikely to 
lead to individual criminal liability, for bribery or perhaps even obstruction of 
justice. 
 
3. The Role of Criminal Law 
 
Before considering the law’s alternatives when it comes to criminal sanctions, 
one should ask whether criminal sanctions are even necessary.  Perhaps private 
arrangements, encouraged by legal regulation, could better control the 
relationship between corporate management and corporate crime.  American law 
also has large and vibrant institutions of civil sanctioning, both private and public, 
and those institutions are as theoretically open to normative analysis and reform 
as institutions of criminal sanctioning. 
 
 3.1 PRIVATE SANCTIONING 
 
Many non-legal incentives influence the corporate agent in decisions about 
whether to engage in behaviors that violate the law.  Chief among these are the 
hiring, compensation, and promotion programs of a particular firm, which can 
vary widely and are subject to relatively little legal control (Arlen and Kraakman 
1997; Efendi et al. 2007).  (At least not substantively; disclosure regimes are 
extensive.) 
 
Another group of important influences are temporal.  When an actor knows 
herself to be in a last period of employment, or that her firm may be in a final 
period of solvency, her incentives can change dramatically (Arlen and Carney 
1992).  Reputational incentives can also be important, and may push in the other 
direction, if a corporate actor expects to have a prolonged career in her profession 
or industry.  Perhaps these non-legal forces can be manipulated through legal 
                                                      
7 The case has been somewhat opaque since the release of an initial, extremely detailed media 
report (Barstow 2012).  See Aruna Viswanatha and Devlin Barrett, Wal-Mart Bribery Probe Finds 
Few Signs of Major Misconduct in Mexico, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2015. 
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policy, as many observers have discussed with respect to the banking industry in 
the wake of the 2008 crisis. 
 
Just as one can debate how to structure the financial and career incentives of 
managers to counteract the potentially damaging agency costs of “short termism,” 
one could discuss how to arrange those incentives to reward efforts to prevent 
corporate crime.  Available tools, which could be encouraged as a matter of good 
corporate governance or mandated by legal regimes, include restricted stock (or 
bonuses) that would vest (or be paid) only after a specified tenure of “clean” 
(crime-free) management; provisions for clawing back compensation in the event 
of corporate crime; and even abandonment of equity compensation altogether.  
Indeed, some legal regimes are moving in this direction.8 
 
The details of such programs are devilish, as they are in general on the 
question of the optimal structure of compensation for executives of large public 
firms, a question that has hardly produced consensus in an extensive recent 
literature.  (Bhagat et al. 2014).  Unanticipated and perverse consequences are 
always a problem in such design projects.  Indeed, consider all that has happened 
with option compensation itself. 
 
Among other problems, this type of program would import into the arena of 
compensation design many of the same difficulties that confront the design and 
enforcement of regimes of corporate criminal liability themselves.  The challenge 
is more than getting to a compensation system that eliminates or dampens the 
agency cost problem in corporate crime.  It is also defining what instances of 
corporate crime are in fact the product of agency costs and thus the ones that 
ought to implicate management’s compensation.  That is, shifting the point of 
intervention from liability to compensation does not avoid the challenge of 
determining when the instrument should apply.  Moreover, compensation 
penalties could perversely enhance managerial incentives not to report or to cover 
up corporate crime (Arlen 1994). 
 
There is also a problem of theory.  This problem is implicated in the general 
problem of corporate criminal liability but it arises more directly and 
problematically in the design of management compensation.  The problem of 
crime by corporations is not just a problem of agency costs between owners and 
managers (and employees) of large firms.  It is also, maybe even principally, a 
problem of externalities (Schwartz 2015).  The non-investing public has at least as 
big a stake in the regulation of corporate crime as the investing public, especially 
when it comes to the big cases—the ones involving reverberating harms caused 
by banks, oil companies, automobile manufacturers, and other large industrial 
firms.  But, the lessons of 2008 and other systemic crises notwithstanding, the 
                                                      
8 See Hamid Mehran & Joseph Tracy, Deferred Cash Compensation:  Enhancing Stability in the 
Financial Services Industry, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POLICY REV., Aug. 2016; Bank of 
England, News Release, Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority 
Announce New Rules on Remuneration, June 23, 2015. 
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non-investing public does not have as big a stake in the design of executive 
compensation as do firms’ investors.  Put differently, managerial short termism 
with respect to the financial performance of the firm is not the same problem as 
managerial short termism with respect to the social costs of corporate crime. 
 
A deeper literature, both positive and normative, on the relationship between 
management compensation and corporate crime would certainly be welcome.  
There is much work to do before it will be known whether compensation is a 
more promising instrument for deterring corporate crime, and specifically for 
addressing the relationship between firm managers and crimes committed by the 
firm’s employees, than the status quo arrangements of American law. 
 
 3.2 CIVIL SANCTIONING 
 
Two observations would seem to make civil sanctioning an attractive response 
to the type of corporate malfeasance that concerns this chapter.  First, American 
law places well known heightened constraints on criminal sanctioning, in both its 
rules of substantive criminal liability and its regime of criminal procedure.  
Enforcers thus can levy civil sanctions on corporate managers more easily than 
criminal ones.  Second, corporations cannot be imprisoned.  Civil sanctioning 
regimes thus could sanction corporations just as well as criminal prosecution 
(Khanna 1996).  Oddly, though perhaps not illogically, these two observations 
add up to the claim that when it comes to corporate crime the difficulties of 
criminal sanctions should be avoided altogether because such sanctions are both 
exceptional and not really that special at all. 
 
In the theoretical argument over corporate criminal liability, comparative 
arguments about civil and criminal sanctioning for corporations have been the 
heart of the contest (Fishel and Sykes 1996, Khanna 1996).  To repeat, this 
chapter does not seek to settle that enduring debate.  Indeed, it is not likely an 
argument that can be won with the tools of theory.  Its final resolution depends on 
empirical questions that could not be answered except through grandiose 
counterfactual experimentation. 
 
On paper, one can design all manner of civil sanctioning regimes, applicable 
to both individual corporate managers and firms, that might achieve the optimal 
deterrence of corporate crime.  One can even imagine a world in which Congress 
enacted a theoretically optimal set of regimes, perhaps abetted by new 
administrative enforcement structures.  One cannot know without trying, 
however, whether such a regime would perform better than the current mix of 
civil and criminal liability, or any other mix that does include some form of 
corporate criminal liability. 
 
Much of this uncertainty is because the effects of criminal sanctions include 
components that are difficult to specify in theoretical models or measure in 
empirical analysis.  Most would agree as a matter of positive fact that criminal 
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sanctioning includes a stigmatic (or expressive or normative or reputational) 
effect that civil sanctioning cannot fully replicate.  That effect has a lot to do with 
social meaning (Buell 2006, Kahan 1997).  Therefore, it is highly contingent on 
particular social and legal arrangements.  Theory can suggest a lot, including even 
arrangements in which criminal sanctioning no longer has such special effects and 
civil sanctioning has more communicative potency.  At that point, “criminal” and 
“civil” would no longer mean what they now do and the discussion is left on dry 
ground that does not seem a useful place from which to think about problems like 
BP, GM, JP Morgan, and Walmart. 
 
The argument over civil versus criminal sanctioning can be somewhat 
advanced with what is known about present legal institutions.  As for individual 
corporate managers, at least two forces that appear difficult to dislodge constrain 
the influence of civil sanctions.  First is the basic structure of American corporate 
law, which not only allows but welcomes indemnification, advancement, and 
compensation of managers for sanctions, attorneys’ fees, and other expected costs 
of liability for conduct on the job (Baker and Griffith 2010, Buell 2007).  Not 
only does law bless these arrangements, the market for corporate talent makes 
them the norm.9  On top of this, corporate law has ensconced the business 
judgment rule, a special substantive doctrine of deference that, where it applies, 
places a legal buffer around the decisions of corporate managers.10 
 
It is believed that that the economy is better off when the most talented 
managers can be persuaded to take legally risky jobs, and to take risks while 
doing those jobs, without excessive fear of personal ruin.  Legal analysis in this 
area can be criticized for sometimes speaking out of both sides of the mouth:  “Hit 
those managers hard in their own pockets, that will deter all this corporate 
malfeasance.  But don’t scare away the talent lest we squelch innovation and job 
creation.”11 
 
A second force limiting civil sanctioning of individual managers is asset 
insufficiency.  In the language of economic analysis, the corporate manager will 
often turn out to be insolvent in relation to the optimal sanction.  According to the 
Beckerian model, the less likely is detection of crime—by consensus a special 
problem in the corporate context—the higher the sanction must be set in the cases 
that are prosecuted (Becker 1968). 
 
The problem is worse than that, ex post the corporate crisis, managers might 
have pockets too shallow for a big enough fine.  (Think of Enron’s Ken Lay or 
                                                      
9 There are limits to indemnification for monetary sanctions imposed for criminal or bad faith 
conduct, and imprisonment of course cannot be indemnified against.  But advancement of 
expenses in defending against such charges is allowable and routine, and claw-back of advanced 
expenses following liability has been sporadic at best. 
10 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
11 This sort of ambivalence about the capitalist project pervades the project of managing corporate 
wrongdoing and is the organizing theme of this author’s book-length treatment of corporate crime 
(Buell 2016). 
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Worldcom’s Bernard Ebbers, who levered everything they had on their equity 
holdings in their own companies.)  It is that the wealth that managers have 
accumulated might largely have come from the troubled corporate venture itself, 
whether or not that wealth represents proceeds of actual crimes.  They may have 
substantial funds in their own pockets but those funds can consist of recent 
compensation rather than a wealth stake accumulated while working for years by 
the sweat of the brow. 
 
Civil sanctions would have to make it so the game of potentially lucrative 
misconduct is not worth the candle for senior managers.  But if the firm doles out 
the candles to the players just for sitting down at the table, there is little reason not 
to play—even if the player perceives a high risk that both the game and the candle 
will be lost.  While shareholders, at least in theory, do not want managers to 
engage in legal misconduct, shareholders do want managers to engage in some 
level of risk-taking.  American markets and law not only allow but encourage 
open, welcoming tables and robust incentives for corporate players to play the 
game, including the riskiest versions of the game in which aggressive players can 
go all in, that is, bet the firm. 
 
Moving from the individual to the firm, the two most important observations 
about current sanctioning institutions have to do with criminal liability, not civil.  
First, criminal liability imposes, and therefore threatens, a reputational 
consequence on firms that civil liability cannot replicate under current conditions.  
Reputational sanctions are hard to measure fully and their sources are multiple 
and complex (Arlen and Alexander 2017, Karpoff et al. 2008, Karpoff and Lott 
1994).  It is not fully clear how the criminal legal process interacts with other 
factors such as publicity and the nature of a firm’s industry to produce the 
reputational sanction.  But that sanction is real, it can be an existential threat to at 
least some types of firms, and whatever reputational effects civil lawsuits or 
enforcement actions might have are not as strong. 
 
Second, present institutional arrangements mean that criminal sanctioning 
communicates more strongly and differently than civil sanctioning, and can have 
greater material consequences to firms—which, of course, feeds back to the 
reputational effects of corporate criminal liability.  Procedurally, criminal cases 
must meet a much higher burden of proof and must achieve jury unanimity.  
Substantively, criminal statutes usually (though not always) require that the 
government’s proof meet a higher fault standard (mens rea or scienter) than civil 
statutes. 
 
Of course, the Justice Department and corporations rarely go to trial in these 
cases.  And at least some in the corporate sector would argue that prosecutors do 
not always adhere to the Department’s policy of declining to charge or threaten a 
criminal case unless it is strong enough to produce a guilty verdict.12  If this is 
                                                      
12 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Manual § 9-27.220. 
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true, prosecutors may risk losing some of corporate criminal sanctioning’s special 
communicative force.  For now, that does not appear to have happened. 
 
Two other institutional features of the criminal process set corporate criminal 
liability apart from civil (Khanna 1996).  The ability to charge corporations for 
criminal violations creates the power to investigate those violations, which brings 
in an array of investigative tools, most importantly the grand jury, that are not 
available to civil enforcement agencies.  Under present federal law, criminal 
convictions of corporations raise the specter of debarment and de-licensing rules 
that are spread (in disorganized fashion, alas) through the federal regulatory 
regimes that govern many industries.  For many firms, this increases the 
existential threat of corporate criminal liability and supplies prosecutors with 
additional sanctioning leverage not present in civil enforcement. 
 
To continue further down this line would risk rehearsing the full theory debate 
over corporate criminal liability, the bracketing of which has been sincerely 
promised.  Enough has been said to justify what follows:  A closer look at 
precisely how, given the limitations of present legal institutions, criminal law 
might best address the problem of criminally bad management. 
 
4. The Role of Individual Criminal Liability 
 
When it comes to the most costly, systemic lapses in large firms, an effective 
program for deterring corporate crime should cause senior personnel to fear 
personal consequences for failures of management responsibility.  This is a hard 
task for criminal law. 
 
The corpus of Anglo-American criminal law includes crimes and expansive 
theories of liability—such as conspiracy and accomplice liability, and their more 
elaborate modern follow-ons such as RICO (racketeering)—that deal with 
problems of group wrongdoing.  But these doctrines reject, at their philosophical 
cores, the idea of punishing individuals for failing to prevent the wrongs of others.  
As scholars of corporate criminal liability have observed, ancient rules for 
punishing individuals purely vicariously, such as Medieval law’s “frankpledge,” 
have been discarded in the common law’s dustbin (Alschuler 2009). 
 
 4.1 THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT IN CORPORATE CRIME 
 
The most common observations about the limitations of criminal prosecutions 
with respect to senior corporate managers are that cases are hard to win and there 
have not been enough of them to make a difference (Partnoy 2011).  Criminal 
enforcement’s deficits are said to include, among others, thorny problems of 
detection and evidence discovery in the policing of white collar crimes, high 
hurdles to proof in criminal proceedings, and reliable features of individual 




But consider again the relationships between the senior managers of BP, GM, 
JP Morgan, and Walmart and the wrongs described earlier in this chapter:  the 
deaths and oil slicks, the car crashes, the accounting fraud, and the bribery.  
Individual criminal sanctions suffer from a more fundamental limitation in 
deterring corporate crime.  Oftentimes, such sanctions are not directed to the 
source from which individual wrongdoing springs.  Even successfully punishing 
individual violators does not deter the management behaviors that must be 
discouraged in order to prevent corporate crime over the long haul.  And 
punishing managers faces higher barriers than the practical difficulties of criminal 
enforcement.  It runs into the basic architecture of criminal law. 
 
 4.2 THE PROBLEM OF MENS REA 
 
Take a few of the categories of criminal violation most commonly charged in 
investigations of major corporate crime:  fraud, bribery, lying in communications 
to the government (and thus often to the public), and polluting public lands, 
waters, and airways.  The federal criminal code infamously deals with these forms 
of wrongdoing through dozens, if not hundreds, of statutes and regulations, many 
of them nauseatingly complex (Beale 1994).  But most statutes that can lead to 
serious prison time share common forms of threshold that have to do with 
individual mental state, and sometimes also with scale of the harm. 
 
Imposing criminal liability for fraud requires proof that the defendant had the 
specific intent to defraud, meaning that she set about her conduct knowing and 
desiring that it would deceive another person in a way that could lead that person 
to part with property or another important interest (Buell 2011).  In cases of fraud 
by affirmative misrepresentation, this requirement generally includes that the 
defendant knew she was uttering falsehood.  (Some federal cases have suggested 
recklessness as to falsity might be sufficient for criminal liability, though this is 
controversial.)  In cases of fraud by omission or nondisclosure, this requirement 
generally means that the defendant thought about her obligation to make 
disclosure and decided to disregard that duty in order to deceive the victim. 
 
Criminal liability for bribery, including under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, depends not just on proof of a quid pro quo (a contract-like understanding) 
between the briber and bribed official (or at least an attempt by the briber to 
create one) but also on the defendant having acted with a “corrupt” state of mind, 
meaning the purpose of inducing the official to violate legal obligations.13 
 
Laws that police honesty in dealings with the government usually authorize 
criminal sanctions only upon proof that an individual knew of the falsity of, for 
example, a regulatory filing.14  A good example are the so-called Sarbanes-Oxley 
certification requirements, statutes sometimes said to be a strong tool against 
                                                      
13 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 666; United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 1995). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 1001; United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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corporate managers because they require senior officials to personally certify the 
accuracy of financial statements on pain of criminal punishment.15  Criminal 
violations of these statutes require proof that the signer knew that the financial 
statements were false; reliance on accountants, lawyers, and other delegates of 
responsibility is as much a defense under these laws as it has always been in cases 
of financial reporting fraud. 
 
Tax prosecutions include a general mistake-of-law defense, under Supreme 
Court rulings that the requirement that the defendant have acted “willfully” in the 
criminal tax statutes means he must have acted with knowledge of illegality.16  
Securities regulations include a provision that provides a kind of mistake-of-law 
defense for violating the SEC’s filing requirements if the defendant can prove he 
lacked knowledge of the relevant rule.17  Money laundering liability requires 
proof that the defendant knew the funds he helped bank or otherwise transact 
derived from criminal activity.18  Felony liability for violating the Clean Water 
Act requires proof of actual knowledge that a discharge is unauthorized or 
exceeds a permit.19  Felony liability for misbranding pharmaceuticals (that is, 
illegally marketing them for off-label use) requires proof of intent to defraud.20  
All of these mens rea requirements are subject, of course, to the general 
constitutional mandate of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.21 
 
For crimes based on knowledge rather than forms of specific intent (to 
defraud, to obstruct justice, and the like), the doctrine of willful blindness might 
appear to ease the path to conviction.  But the federal courts have been at pains to 
prevent this doctrine from being treated as anything less than a genuine, and 
justifiable, substitute for knowledge.22 
 
Willful blindness is not recklessness.  A defendant’s awareness of some risk 
of falsity or some risk that banked funds are derived from crime, for example, will 
not suffice.  A defendant must both know of a substantial risk that the operative 
fact exists and take affirmative step to avoid acquiring additional knowledge.  
Red flags thus are not sufficient to establish willful blindness.  Chronic 
inattention, as opposed to affirmative suppression of information, also will not 
suffice.  Courts seek a basis for concluding that the defendant all but knew, such 
as a directive to others not to inform the defendant or an otherwise inexplicable 
failure to act in response to information.23 
                                                      
15 18 U.S.C. § 1350. 
16 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991). 
17 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 
18 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957. 
19 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). 
20 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2). 
21 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
22 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011); United States v. Salinas, 763 
F.3d 869 (7th Cir 2014). 
23 Although it didn’t matter because the proof of actual knowledge was overwhelming, the Second 
Circuit may have pushed the envelope a bit in approving the use of a willful blindness argument in 
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The mens rea demands of substantive criminal law mean two things for the 
large cases of corporate crime that concern this chapter.  First, provable, and thus 
punishable, criminal violators will tend to occupy lower rungs on the corporate 
ladder.  There will be the occasional case like Enron or Worldcom in which a 
conspiracy to commit accounting fraud, for example, extends fully into the inner 
management suite.  But in most cases individuals close enough to execution of the 
product or transaction to know enough for criminal liability will not be the senior 
managers (and certainly not the board members) who bear responsibility for 
designing and implementing systems for the prevention of crime. 
 
Second, senior managers will know—whether they admit to liking it or not—
that they enjoy insulation from punishment for the vast majority of criminal 
violations that might occur within their firms, even as they may benefit from the 
enhanced corporate income or reduced costs such crimes produce.  Indeed, the 
effect of criminal law is at least partially perverse:  The demands of proof of mens 
rea for individual criminal liability provide an incentive for managers to shield 
themselves from what is going on, possibly reducing corporate efforts to prevent 
crime.  A compulsion to golf is bad corporate management but good criminal 
defense.  (The point about a perverse incentive not to monitor, of course, has also 
been made with respect to corporate criminal liability (Arlen 1994).) 
 
American criminal law is far from naïve about the problem of individuals who 
shield themselves from liability for the crimes of underlings.  Long experience 
with organized crime, international narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and other 
problems has produced flexible and powerful statutes and doctrine such as 
conspiracy law, RICO, and broad anti-terrorism laws.  But BP’s Tony Hayward is 
not Tony Soprano.  The nonfictional likes of Soprano have been convicted under 
conspiracy laws and their analogues without proof of direct involvement in 
substantive offenses because their businesses are thoroughly, completely criminal.  
Proof of “association,” “involvement,” and the like is itself proof, at least in part, 
of criminality. 
 
This proof dynamic is unavailable in cases of corporate crime.  Senior 
managers of even the most broken corporations spend most of their time on 
legitimate activities that have been licensed, indeed warmly welcomed, by state 
and federal governments.  No defendant would attempt, at a criminal trial, to 
disprove the existence of British Petroleum as one might dispute the existence of 
La Cosa Nostra. Calls to “use RICO against the big banks” and like firms are 
tiresome given that RICO, while a powerful device for dealing with problems like 
joinder and statute of limitations, in no way displaces the requirement that 
underlying criminal violations be proved.24  Labeling Lehman Brothers a “RICO 
                                                                                                                                            
the prosecution of Worldcom’s Bernard Ebbers on the ground, the court said, that there was 
evidence that Ebbers threw reports in the trash without reading them.  United States v. Ebbers, 458 
F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). 
24 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 to 1963. 
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enterprise” would not have been a way of bootstrapping individual criminal 
violations by mid and lower-level employees into crimes by management 
personnel. 
 
 4.3 THE PROBLEM OF ACTUS REUS 
 
Generally speaking, American law rejects criminal liability for omissions.  
Failure to rescue, failure to aid, and (most aptly here) failure to prevent another 
from committing a crime (or even failing to help the police catch a violator) do 
not give rise to criminal liability.  Whatever morality mandates, our legal 
obligations to each other do not generally require us to do these things (LaFave 
2010). 
 
The matter of duties to render aid is, of course, subject to lively normative 
debate.  But positive law sides with familiar arguments against such criminal 
liability, ranging from American commitments to individual liberty and choice, to 
worries about incentives that might cause people to do more harm than good, to 
deep problems of line-drawing in specifying conditions under which law might 
obligate affirmative action (Dressler 2012). 
 
Exceptions to this principle are constructed around duty, which is certainly a 
familiar concept in the legal regulation of corporate managers.  But “duty” is of 
course an empty concept standing alone:  One has a legal duty to do what law 
imposes a duty to do. 
 
In criminal law, the duties that courts and legislators have found to give rise to 
an obligation to act, at pain of criminal liability for omissions, are those that 
inhere in special relationships such as parent-child, spouse-spouse, doctor-patient, 
or teacher-student.  The duty question most often arises with so-called result 
crimes, in which the issue is the duty of the omitting person (such as the parent) to 
have acted to prevent a harmful result (such as death) that befell the victim (such 
as the child).  A sadly repeating fact pattern is the obtuse or abusive parent 
prosecuted for failing to obtain medical help for a child who was gravely ill or 
injured and ultimately died.25 
 
Drafters of criminal laws have the option of sweeping within those duty 
relationships that give rise to a general theory of omission liability the relationship 
between a corporation’s managers and its owners.  (I assume the relevant duty 
would not run between managers and the public at large, for that would be a 
capacious duty without analogue in existing law.)  The argument perhaps would 
hold that a corporate manager can be criminally liable for omitting to prevent the 
crime of a corporate employee because she has a duty to prevent harm to the 
corporation and crime (or this crime) harms the corporation. 
 
                                                      
25 E.g., State v. Norman, 808 P.2d 1159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). 
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This sort of move would strain the basic structure of American criminal law, 
not to mention corporate law.  It is difficult to think of any analogue to this form 
of duty in the relationships that criminal law has recognized as giving rise to 
omission liability.  These relationships generally are close, one-to-one, and such 
that the bearer of the duty is positioned highly proximate to the harm.  Given the 
role occupied by the duty bearer and her capacity to respond and intervene (the 
parent being the paradigm case), the instrumental and deontological cases for 
punishing the failure to act are persuasive.  Criminal law’s restrictions on the 
categories and scopes of these duties ensure that the omission cases that are 
prosecuted tend to be normatively compelling. 
 
For example, criminal law might impose liability on a school nurse who kept a 
drug-overdosing student “resting” in the infirmary instead of calling for an 
ambulance if the student then had a seizure and died for lack of speedy 
hospitalization.  However, criminal law would not likely impose liability on the 
nurse who sat in his office while a deadly virus spread undetected in the cafeteria 
because he had failed to distribute hand sanitizer throughout the building. 
 
Some of the difference between these two cases has to do with the degree and 
form of the actor’s recklessness or negligence.  But a lot has to do with how the 
duties are conceived—conceptions that implicitly include considerations of the 
causal relationship between the bearer of the duty and the harmful result.  In the 
sort of corporate cases relevant here, the senior manager is much more like the 
second nurse than the first. 
 
A requirement that the corporate manager act based on a duty extending to all 
corporate affairs would also dismantle barriers between corporate and criminal 
law.  This is a familiar worry from the long legal contest over the use of an 
“honest services” theory under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes to 
prosecute corporate officials for breaches of loyalty to corporate owners.  That 
struggle concluded with the Supreme Court rejecting the idea of criminal fraud 
based solely on a duty breach, requiring prosecutors to prove that such a 
miscreant corporate official also received a bribe or a kickback.26  It would be an 
even greater threat to regimes of corporate regulation to bootstrap a general duty 
of managers to prevent corporate crime—a Caremark duty, that is—into a form of 
criminal liability.27 
 
One might complain that the phenomenon of criminally bad management is 
not really a matter of omissions to act at all.  If one adjusts the time frame in these 
cases, one can make the manager’s failure to intervene and prevent crime a form 
of affirmative participation (Kelman 1981).  When managers of GM pushed 
aggressive cost cutting through the company, their acts provided incentives for 
                                                      
26 See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010); see also id. at 415 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
27 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ct. Chancery 1996); see also 
Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677 
(2007). 
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employees deeper within the firm to take steps that caused the ignition switch 
failures.  When managers of BP implemented a strategy of going for riskier 
offshore deposits, they caused the Deep Horizon well to blow up.  When JP 
Morgan’s managers set their compensation and monitoring programs for their 
derivatives traders, they caused the traders to deliberately mismark the books.  
When Walmart’s global managers pushed fast into Mexico, they caused managers 
there to use bribery to get stores built. 
 
Moving the time frame in this way, though, only runs the problem into the 
other pillar of criminal law, that is, mens rea.  Put another way, concurrence of 
the elements is a requirement in analysis of criminal liability.  The further back 
one moves in time to locate the actus reus, the weaker the argument is for the 
relationship between any mens rea at that point in time and later events for which 
one might argue responsibility should be imposed. 
 
And moving the time frame requires playing another game of stretching in 
criminal law, one much like stretching time frames:  the game of levels of 
abstraction.  This is a recurring problem in cases of negligence or recklessness.  
The relevant criminal event now has to be some well accident, some auto 
engineering failure, some financial misreporting, or some bribery—not the actual 
violations in the case. 
 
The existing contours of criminal law either cannot accommodate individual 
liability for criminally bad management, or they can do so only with strained and 
questionable arguments.  One turns, then, to the question of how individual 
criminal liability might be reshaped to address criminally bad management. 
 
 4.4 STRICT LIABILITY AND PATHS FOR REFORM 
 
Law could reject, or at least migrate away from, the basic architecture just 
described.  It could impose punishment for forms of management misconduct, or 
undesirable behavior, not previously subject to serious criminal liability.  These 
days, any such expansionist move raises hackles because of the American 
criminal justice system’s bad reputation for overcriminalization in substantive law 
and overincarceration in the enforcement of law.  But the option nonetheless 
should be examined. 
 
One direction for reform would be to dispense with mens rea requirements 
and impose liability solely on a manager’s relationship of supervision or 
responsibility toward the part of a corporation’s operations in which wrongdoing 
occurs.  There are, of course, already lots of strict liability offenses in federal 
white collar criminal law.  Industry groups and overcriminalization critics have 
long lamented this (Walsh and Joslyn 2010). 
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Some federal statutes do impose liability for particular non-actions 
(omissions).  It can be a crime, for example, to fail to file one’s taxes28 or to fail to 
maintain adequate systems of accounting controls.29  With these offenses, there is 
no need to wade into murky questions of general duties.  If there is something the 
law really wants corporate managers to do, a statute can simply say what that is 
and that criminal penalties may be imposed for failing to do it. 
 
This is what the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine does.  It is a form of 
liability imposed by a limited number of federal statutes (Henning 2014, 
Sepinwall 2014).  These rules are often described as something like “strict 
liability for CEOs.”  But they are more than that.  They are strict liability for 
omissions to act.  And it is the omission part (the lack of affirmative actus reus), 
not the strict liability part (the lack of mens rea) that really make the responsible 
corporate officer doctrine American criminal law’s closest thing to a crime of 
criminally bad management. 
 
John Park of the famous United States v. Park 30  was President of 
Philadelphia-based Acme Markets, Inc., a company the FDA caught with rat 
droppings in its Baltimore warehouse.  Park was held criminally liable because he 
failed to do enough about sanitation in his company’s facilities when that matter 
was within his responsibilities as head of the company.  Indeed, while his liability 
was technically strict under the statute, Park himself had some mens rea:  The 
FDA had warned the company in writing about the problem in its warehouses and 
Park saw the FDA’s letter. 
 
The responsible corporate officer doctrine probably gets more attention in law 
schools and legal commentary than it deserves.  There is no general such 
“doctrine” in federal law.  It can arise only by statute.  Instances in which I am 
aware of Congress imposing this form of liability are in the Food Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), for responsible managers failing to prevent the 
misbranding or adulteration of statutorily covered products,31 and in the Clean 
Water and Clean Air Acts, for responsible managers failing to prevent covered 
discharges without, or in violation of, permits.32  Both of these statutes impose 
misdemeanor liability only. 
 
The closest thing to these offenses in securities law is the “books and records” 
provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which can be violated by the 
mere failure to maintain adequate systems of accounting controls. 33   The 
securities prohibition, however broad, does not impose strict criminal liability:  a 
criminal case requires proof that the defendant “willfully” violated the record-
                                                      
28 26 U.S.C. § 7203. 
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78ff. 
30 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
31 21 U.S.C. § 331 (as interpreted in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)). 
32 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6). 
33 15 U.S.C. § 78m. 
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keeping requirements.34  Regulatory crimes such as these, which the Supreme 
Court has sometimes referred to as “public welfare offenses,”35 are not often 
implicated in the big corporate scandals involving fraud, bribery, safety, and 
pollution. 
 
If this style of criminal offense were expanded into the realm of serious felony 
punishment, two constitutional challenges would be likely.  First, a statute would 
have to describe the “it” that the corporate manager could be punished for 
omitting to do, with sufficient specificity to defeat constitutional notice 
objections.  “Manage well at pain of imprisonment” might not be a 
constitutionally acceptable rule.  Second, if the Supreme Court had occasion to 
review the question of what scope of strict liability Congress intended to impose 
on corporate managers for failure to act, it might not hold to the expansiveness of 
the Park decision. 
 
Concededly, the only case in which the Court has rejected criminal omission 
liability on due process grounds is the famous and dated case of Lambert v. 
California,36 in which Los Angeles attempted to criminalize the act of being in the 
city by convicted felons who had failed to register with city hall.  The problem in 
Lambert was the combination of omission liability with unfair surprise about the 
content of law.  If Congress wanted to make it a crime for the CEO or CFO of a 
public corporation to fail to prevent securities fraud by the company’s employees, 
maybe it could do so.  But probably only within reason, and maybe not beyond 
misdemeanor liability. 
 
In any event, the ultimate issue is normative.  Should American law impose 
criminal omission liability on corporate managers for failure to prevent fraud, 
bribery, environmental offenses, and the like?  Overdeterrence would be the 
obvious and fairly massive worry.  If we really wanted to deter managers from 
allowing or failing to prevent corporate crime, we could take the China approach:  
the death penalty for tainted milk.  (Assuming that the defendants in that example 
did not taint the milk themselves, directly or indirectly.)  Deterrence arguments, 
carried to the extreme, can be used to justify punishing even wholly innocent 
persons. 
 
Responsible corporate officer liability under the FDCA and CWA does not 
seem to have shut down pharma or the sewage treatment industry, nor has it 
destroyed the market for executives in those sectors.  Would imposing such 
liability for fraud in the banking industry, for example, decimate entrepreneurship 
in finance and scare competent managers away from such jobs?  It is clear what 
the Chamber of Commerce would say.  But it is hard to know. 
 
                                                      
34 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. 
35 E.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). 
36 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
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The more compelling objection to this kind of legislative program is a prior 
one.  It likely would lead to punishment of those who do not deserve it.  As is the 
habit in the American criminal justice system, especially the federal one, 
prosecutors could be relied on to charge only managers whose nonfeasance was 
truly appalling.37  But that is not guaranteed to be the outcome. 
 
A corporate manager, one might fairly contend, simply does not deserve 
imprisonment sanctions for failing to prevent a fraud of which she was not aware.  
(If she was aware, then she is likely liable for conspiring or aiding and abetting.)  
This is not a controversial assertion.  It will not become one until the American 
social and economic order experiences changes that have nothing to do with 
criminal law—that is, a fundamental re-conception of the role of the for-profit 
corporation in society and the moral obligations that those who control it have to 
the rest of us.38 
 
To be sure, the sort of criminally bad management under discussion here can 
fall between full-blown, conventional group criminal liability and strict liability 
for failure to prevent crime.  A responsible manager might have known enough to 
be seriously at fault in what happened but not enough to have been an accomplice 
or conspirator in the specific criminal violation. 
 
So what might be accomplished through new crimes of recklessness or 
negligence?  Consider, for example, what England has recently done.  Parliament 
has enacted a criminal offense, punishable by up to seven years in prison, of what 
might be called (though English law does not call it this) reckless bankruptcy of a 
bank.39  The elements of this crime are the following:  (1) that the defendant was a 
senior manager of a financial institution (these are defined terms), (2) that the 
defendant participated in a decision or failed to take steps to prevent a decision, 
(3) which decision caused the failure of the financial institution, (4) the defendant 
was aware at the time of the decision that implementing the decision risked the 
failure of the institution, and (5) the defendant’s “conduct in relation to the taking 
of the decision [fell] far below what could reasonably be expected of a person in 
[the defendant’s] position.” 
 
                                                      
37 For example, in a notable recent prosecution the government deployed the responsible corporate 
officer doctrine to obtain three-month prison sentences for managers of an egg business that 
shipped products with salmonella, sickening purchasers.  The government’s proof included 
abundant, though legally unnecessary, evidence of the defendants’ negligence.  United States v. 
DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626 (8th Cir. 2016).  Indeed, one appellate judge concurred in affirming the 
prison sentences, he said, only because of the presence of the negligence evidence. 
38 Morally, corporate responsibility does not approximate military command responsibility.  In the 
context of warfare, law and norms justify holding the supervisor responsible for the crimes of 
subordinates because the supervisor must train, and order, subordinates to surrender their moral 
agency, including the agency not to kill other humans.  Even in that context, the imposition of 
criminal liability on commanders without requiring some degree of subjective mens rea is 
controversial (Martinez 2007).  
39 UNITED KINGDOM FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 2013 § 36. 
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This criminal statute has no close analogue in American white collar criminal 
law, though some have argued in the wake of the banking crisis that prosecutors 
in the United States should have pursued criminal prosecutions of bank managers 
for recklessness, or at least that Congress should have legislated to authorize such 
prosecutions (Partnoy 2011, Eisinger 2014, Taibbi 2014).  There are ironies here.  
American criminal law has clung to some harsh ideas like felony murder and 
capital punishment that English criminal law has jettisoned.  And some may recall 
that after the wave of criminal and civil corporate enforcement in the United 
States following the collapse of Enron in the early 2000s, a common cry of alarm 
in New York and Washington was that capital was fleeing offshore to the safer 
regulatory haven of London.  Perhaps London now looks legally scarier for 
corporate managers. 
 
Recklessness is, of course, a less controversial basis for criminal liability in 
the United States than negligence.  Recklessly caused deaths are routinely treated 
as serious criminal homicides (“involuntary manslaughter”) and recklessness can 
be found in statutes defining other serious offenses, such as forms of assault and 
arson.40 
 
In the corporate context, keep two points about recklessness in mind.  First, 
recklessness in criminal law is not gross or especially serious negligence.  Being 
really careless is not being reckless.  Recklessness is a knowledge state, 
specifically awareness of risk.41  The reckless individual must consciously advert 
to the question of risk and decide to press forward.  That is the form of thinking 
that makes recklessness sufficiently blameworthy to warrant criminal punishment, 
at least when bad things happen after people choose to run risks. 
 
Second, risk in the criminal law is not a vague concept floating in the air.  
Recklessness offenses require that the actor have consciously disregarded a 
sufficiently large and serious risk of a particular sort.  In other words, the mental 
state of recklessness is one element of the offense but the result or factual 
circumstance as to which the actor must be reckless is another and equally 
important element.42  The manslaughter defendant disregards the risk that his 
conduct (drunk driving, for example) will cause the death of another person.  The 
reckless sexual assaulter disregards the risk that the person with whom he has 
intercourse has not consented. 
 
There can be no such thing, therefore, as a crime of “reckless corporate 
management.”  Such an offense would leave the question of reckless as to what?  
England’s new banking statute does not go this far, but maybe it comes close.  
While the statute specifies that the defendant must have been aware of a risk that 
her decision, or the decision she failed to prevent, presented a risk of the financial 
institution failing, “failure” of a firm encompasses a large array of scenarios.  The 
                                                      
40 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.01, 150.05. 
41 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). 
42 Id. 
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statute further defines failure as insolvency but does not say anything about what 
causes qualify and, of course, does not even attempt to specify what level of 
probability constitutes risking the firm for purposes of this law. 
 
The English statute therefore comes down to the part of the offense that 
involves negligence (or perhaps gross negligence), not recklessness:  the 
requirement that the defendant’s “conduct in relation to the taking of the decision 
[fell] far below what could reasonably be expected of a person in [the 
defendant’s] position.”  But then the law is in the perilous and perhaps 
undesirable realm of drawing lines, if they even can be drawn, between the lack of 
due care in management that warrants imprisonment and the carelessness that 
should draw at most a lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty.  And, of course, there 
is the serious, though not consensus, argument that a person’s negligence never 
provides sufficient justification for criminal sanctions (Alexander and Ferzan 
2009). 
 
There is an even more essential point about criminal liability for recklessness 
in this context.  Managers of corporations are supposed to press forward in the 
face of risk of failure.  Indeed, the mere act of taking the management reigns of a 
business necessarily requires one to consider and accept the risk of insolvency. 
 
Consider this rhetorical question, which might seem trenchant (especially for 
the GM case):  “American law imposes felony liability on reckless automobile 
drivers who kill, so why would it be any real departure to impose felony liability 
on senior managers who manage (drive) corporations in a way that kills people?”  
The analogy fails because assessment of risk is completely different in the two 
cases.  Except perhaps in a case of serious exigency, there is no social value in 
risky driving.  There is social value in risky corporate managing, where the 
question is whether and how risks are weighed, not whether they should be taken 
in the first place. 
 
Or think about it this way.  As Ken Simons has explained, risk analysis in the 
criminal law of recklessness and negligence includes a mostly hidden dimension 
of specificity versus generality or, if you like, known identity of the victim or 
harm (Simons 2010).  To take a hypothetical, Sally, the manager of a massive 
tunnel construction project, orders that an expensive section be lowered into place 
immediately, before it breaks at great cost, even though Joe the worker appears 
trapped beneath it and likely will be crushed.  Sally might be guilty not only of 
reckless homicide but of murder.  However, if manager Betty authorizes starting 
the same tunnel construction project in the first place, knowing that there is a high 
probability that at least one worker will be killed during the project, she is not 
likely guilty of any crime at all.  The risk-taking manager of a large bank is 
usually Betty and rarely Sally. 
 
Reform is not out of the question.  But it would be a heavy lift.  The point here 
has been to run to ground the severe limitations of American criminal law, as both 
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a positive and normative matter, as a tool for imposing individual liability on 
corporate managers for running firms in ways that enable and fail to discourage 
criminal violations by employees. 
 
Take the individual prosecution of Donald Blankenship, the CEO and 
Chairman of Massey Energy, a now notoriously transgressing coal company.43 
The government alleged that Blankenship “closely managed” (indeed, obsessively 
micromanaged) the company, that he knew of hundreds of safety violations, that 
he “had the ability to prevent most of the violations,” and that, in a ruthless quest 
to extract coal profits, he “fostered and participated in an understanding that 
perpetuated [a] practice of routine safety violations” at a West Virginia mine that 
eventually experienced a fatal explosion that killed nearly 30 miners.  If the 
government had proved even half of the facts alleged, it would have established a 
level of personal culpability of Blankenship for disastrous corporate management 
that far outstrips a case like BP, GM, JP Morgan’s London Whale, or Walmart. 
 
Nevertheless, the government secured a conviction of Blankenship only for 
one misdemeanor count charging a mine safety violation.  On the other charges, 
which included securities fraud, the government was unable to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, among other propositions, that Blankenship knew it was a lie 
for the company to say that it “does not condone” mine safety violations and 
strives “to be in compliance with all regulations at all times”; or that Blankenship 
conspired with others at the company to willfully violate mine safety laws and to 
obstruct the Mine Safety and Health Administration from enforcing federal law.  
Blankenship was a micromanager but things still became cloudy at his trial. 
 
Even the most culpable of corporate managers can be hard to convict for what 
happens on their watches.  The fit between basic concepts of individual criminal 
responsibility, which have remained stable for a long time, and the structure of the 
large corporate institution, which has changed a great deal over time, is awkward 
at best. 
 
5. The Role of Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
There is a gap when the law comes to management responsibility for 
corporate crime.  Increasing public frustration with corporate crime has produced 
a demand for law to fill that gap.  Politically responsive institutions, chiefly 
prosecutors’ offices, have looked for ways to use existing legal tools to meet that 
demand.  The story of corporate criminal liability’s evolution and growth in the 
American legal system over the last two or three decades can be understood as 
driven, in important part, by this dynamic between public demand and 
enforcement institutions. 
 
                                                      
43 United States v. Blankenship, Crim. No. 5:14-cr-00244 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 13, 2014) 
(indictment). 
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Corporate criminal liability has been serving as a substitute to individual 
criminal liability.  It functions to deter corporate managers from engaging in 
practices that enable and tolerate employees’ criminal violations.  Whether this 
legal tool is optimal or not is unclear and remains hotly debated.  Meanwhile, both 
corporate managers and federal prosecutors act as if they understand corporate 
criminal liability as filling the gap. 
 
 5.1 MANAGERS AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
If one spends time with the corporate defense bar and corporate 
management—even if one regularly reads the Wall Street Journal and the 
business pages—one cannot help but appreciate how the prospect of corporate 
criminal liability is the first, last, and greatest concern of legal risk for corporate 
managers and their counsel.  In most or all major industries, managing the firm to 
avoid this form of legal sanction is an overriding practical imperative. 
 
When managers think about corporate criminal liability, they do not of course 
think about the prospect of landing in prison themselves.  But they do think about 
personal consequences.  To steer one’s company into the roiling waters of 
indictment and likely conviction is, in many important economic sectors, to have 
failed almost per se as an executive—with all the consequences that might bring 
in reduced compensation, shrunken reputation, weaker career prospects, and lost 
self-esteem.  A massive federal investigation followed by admission of 
widespread misconduct and an onerous settlement can be harmful to an executive 
resume. 
 
Many of corporate criminal liability’s costs, to firms and thus indirectly to 
those in charge, can be measured in lost market capitalization, loss of revenue 
from clients or customers, and lost income opportunities from temporary or 
permanent cancellation of licenses and contracts in whole lines of business.  
Those grave material costs can run as far as liquidation of the firm, the doomsday 
scenario contemplated in sectors such as professional services, pharmaceutical 
manufacturing, and (at least until recently) banking. 
 
Personal costs in this scenario can extend beyond those to the firm, at least as 
a temporal matter.  The manager who runs the corporate ship aground on a 
criminal prosecution may have a hard time, at least in the market for public 
company executives, getting that signal event off of her resume.  And the 
psychological consequences could be lasting and profound.  The committed 
executive of the large firm has to have the success, much less the survival, of the 
firm deeply woven into her personal identity. 
 
The corporate management profession would not expend such enormous 
energy—both in individual cases and in general discussion about regulatory 
policy—lamenting corporate criminal liability, and fighting its imposition, if this 
form of sanction did not, from managers’ perspective, have a sharp, even deadly, 
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bite.  Managers are highly motivated to avoid corporate criminal liability.   Thus 
corporate criminal liability has a deterrent effect on managers even when 
managers face no prospect of individual criminal liability. 
 
The skeptic might respond with two thoughts.  First, those who manage 
America’s largest corporations might prefer the risk of an occasional, episodic 
run-in with the Department of Justice when something goes wrong to 
comprehensive, aggressive programs of preventative regulation imposed 
throughout industries.  Incessant talk about corporate criminal liability is a way of 
keeping the discussion about regulating corporate malfeasance in that arena and 
leaving the impression that corporate criminal liability is a costly, and therefore 
effective, control on industry.  Second, managers might talk up the potency of 
corporate criminal liability to play into prosecutors’ fears that corporate criminal 
liability can be too strong, imposing bad collateral consequences that include 
destruction of jobs and other economic value.  This kind of talk conditions 
prosecutors to be more amenable to forms of settlement that forego indictments 
and trials, and maybe more open to declining prosecution altogether. 
 
If one has closely followed the discussions in this field over the last two 
decades, it seems implausible that corporate managers secretly like corporate 
criminal liability and enjoy dealing with the Justice Department.  Of course 
industrial interests exaggerate the problems they face.  It used to be said that no 
major bank could sustain a criminal conviction without having to close its doors; 
now several of them have pled guilty to antitrust and other violations with only 
short-term harm to their stock prices.44 
 
But the expenses firms incur in managing even potential prosecutions speak to 
their treatment of corporate criminal liability as a deadly serious matter.  Siemens 
Corporation, for example, spent over $1 billion on professional services 
(primarily law and forensic accounting) to curry favor with the Justice 
Department and a court when it ultimately resolved its criminal bribery case.45  
Walmart has by now spent well over $500 million in legal fees in a similar effort, 
with resolution of its case still to come.46  There is a reason why the defense 
practice in the field of government investigations and white collar crime has 
become such a lucrative mainstay for America’s largest corporate law firms:  
These are treated as bet the company cases; management does not dare slash these 
legal expenses in the manner that has threatened large law firms’ practices in 
                                                      
44 See Plea Agreement, United States v. Credit Suisse AG, No. 1:14-CR-188 (E.D. Va. May 19, 
2014); Statement of Facts, United States v. Credit Suisse AG, No. 1:14-CR-188 (E.D. Va. May 19, 
2014); Statement of Facts, United States v. BNP Paribas, S.A. (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014); Andrew 
Grossman, John Letzing, & Devlin Barrett, Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty in Criminal Tax Case: 
Agrees to Pay $2.6 Billion to Settle Probe by U.S. Justice Department, WALL ST. J., May 19, 
2014; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, BNP Paribas Pinned Hopes on Legal Memo, in 
Vain, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2014. 
45 United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellchaft, Crim. No. 1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) 
(Department’s Sentencing Memorandum). 
46 Wal-Mart Says Bribe Probe Cost $439 Million in Two Years, BLOOMBERG, March 26, 2014. 
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areas such as corporate finance, products liability litigation, intellectual property, 
and commercial real estate (Weisselberg and Li 2011). 
 
 5.2 THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
If the manager of the large firm does genuinely fear corporate criminal 
liability, the question is precisely what corporate criminal liability deters 
managers from doing (or encourages them to do).  That question brings in the 
prosecutors. 
 
The Justice Department also understands corporate criminal liability as a tool 
for influencing individual manager behavior.  The now familiar story of the 
evolution over the last several decades of what Jennifer Arlen calls the de facto 
regime of corporate criminal liability does not need repetition, especially for the 
experienced reader in this field (Arlen 2012).  The U.S. Attorney’s Manual, the 
Holder, Thompson et al. memos, the deferred prosecution agreement, the 
nonprosecution agreement, the corporate compliance program, the corporate 
monitor, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for corporations, and the other 
institutions of contemporary federal enforcement and corporate criminal 
defense—these are American corporate criminal liability (Arlen 2012, Garrett 
2014). 
 
The essence of de facto corporate criminal liability is this:  what the Justice 
Department wants above all to see when it confronts a case of corporate crime—
whether as a reason not to prosecute or as a reason to settle on favorable terms—
is effective management practices designed to prevent, and certainly not to foster, 
crime by a firm’s employees.  As documented most clearly in Brandon Garrett’s 
work, prosecutors are more concerned—at least in the mine run of cases involving 
FCPA violations, pharma marketing practices, bank money laundering, 
environmental offenses, and the like—with the organizational dynamics that 
generate corporate crime than they are with the individuals who execute the 
criminal acts (Garrett 2014). 
 
Federal prosecutors just might be right.  At the least, they have a theory for 
what they are doing and are not wantonly throwing around all that discretion they 
enjoy.  (This is an at least partial answer to Judge Jed Rakoff’s puzzling over the 
Department’s emphasis on corporate over individual liability (Rakoff 2014).)  The 
low level sales manager in the foreign office who pays the bribe is fungible.  
Prosecuting the likes of her, one might argue, is like prosecuting all the bookies in 
Brooklyn or Newark and expecting that to make a dent in organized crime.  Using 
corporate criminal liability to effect change in management practices, and perhaps 
even industry practices, has a better prospect of actually reducing corporate crime, 
and the widespread harms it can impose on the public, over the longer term.  
Corporate criminal liability, because of the leverage it affords the government 
over managers both in terrorem and in the negotiation of settlements (and even in 
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the occasional criminal sentencing of a firm), gives prosecutors (and occasionally 
judges) a tool to effect firm and industry-wide change. 
 
Whether or not the Justice Department is succeeding in delivering on the 
promise of its theory is a real question, one that is hard to answer empirically.  
But at least there is a theory.  One can see this theory in action at both the front 
and back ends of cases of corporate criminal liability.  Indictment and settlement 
discussions are dominated by arguing over how much an instance of corporate 
crime can be attributed to bad management.  How high up was the wrongdoing?  
How pervasive?   What kind of compliance program did the firm have?  Is the 
company a recidivist?  The terms of settlements are then dominated by measures 
designed to change management practices to make future violations less likely.47 
 
Maybe corporate criminal liability American style has developed—as the 
voluminous literature has canvassed—by accident, or path dependence, or 
political economy, or rent seeking by the bar, or another dynamic unconnected to 
optimal regulatory design.  But maybe also Justice Department personnel have 
figured out, as they have confronted the scale of firms, the economy, and public 
harms, that the problem of corporate crime is a problem of management.  And that 
individual criminal liability—as lawyers who practice criminal law know better 
than anyone—is not well suited to addressing the source of the problem.  So they 
have turned to corporate criminal liability as the best available alternative among 
the legal tools that federal law gives them. 
 
Even when the Justice Department wants to focus on individual responsibility 
for corporate crime, it cannot help but stress corporate criminal liability.  In 
obvious reaction to public complaint during the Obama Administration that not 
enough senior corporate officials are in prison, a Deputy Attorney General issued 
a memorandum to prosecutors in late 2015 that leaned hard, rhetorically at least, 
on the importance of aggressive prosecution of individuals.48  The memo itself, 
which described six purportedly new initiatives, only restated the basic theory of 
the Justice Department’s longstanding program in corporate crime:  Use corporate 
criminal liability as the means to force firms (i.e., firm management) to police and 
investigate themselves and produce evidence of criminal wrongdoing. 
 
The Justice Department seems to play into the hands of its critics.  Declaring a 
“bold” but not really new effort to prosecute more individual cases confirms the 
misapprehension that more corporate managers would be in prison if only 
prosecutors had tried harder.  Such a declaration leaves unnoticed the fundamental 
barrier:  criminal law, the foundations of which are controlled, even still in this 
age of overcriminalization and discretion, more by Americans and their legislators 
than by prosecutors. 
                                                      
47 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Manual § 9-28.000; United States Secs. & Exchange 
Comm’n Exchange Act Release No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001) (“Seaboard Report”). 
48 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum of Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates to 
Assistant Attorneys General and United States Attorneys, Sept. 9, 2015. 
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 5.3 OPTIMIZING A SECOND-BEST INSTRUMENT 
 
Understanding corporate criminal liability as a tool for deterring criminally 
bad management is not only a path to a more complete positive account of 
corporate criminal liability’s place in American law.  The perspective also 
provides guidance for normative analysis. 
 
If an attractive theory of corporate criminal liability is that it can be used to 
influence senior people to manage firms so as to prevent, and certainly not enable, 
criminal violations by employees, then its practice should seek to optimize that 
influence.  Future analysis and research should pursue the work of scholars, some 
of them economists, who have long evaluated the Justice Department’s 
prosecution work on this score (Arlen and Kraakman 1997). 
 
Firms should be rewarded with no prosecution, or lenient settlement, when 
corporate crimes are committed notwithstanding best efforts.  (Prosecutors must 
beware hindsight bias.)  Firms should be punished more harshly when corporate 
crimes result from bad management.  Self-reporting and cooperation in 
prosecution must continue to earn some reward, lest the Justice Department’s 
enforcement program virtually shut down.  But malfeasance that is genuinely 
institutional must be met with punitive sanctions no matter how well managers 
respond when the firm gets caught. 
 
The difficulties with such enforcement programs lie, of course, in their details, 
which require separate treatment from this discussion.  Much of the evaluation of 
the relationship between corporate crime and the corporate institution, including 
firm management, turns on soft and holistic considerations of institutional culture, 
which are highly situational and fit poorly with traditional forms of legal doctrine.  
The much-lamented prosecutorial discretion in this field may be unavoidable.  But 
that discretion can still be rigorously analyzed and critiqued, and perhaps even 
controlled with law. 
 
Meanwhile, there is some promise that the Justice Department has been at 
least a little responsive to normative analysis.  Towards the end of the last 
administration, leaders of the Criminal Division committed in principle to greater 
clarity, transparency, and rigor in the process of evaluating firms’ compliance 
efforts and the relationship of those efforts to decisions whether to prosecute, not 
prosecute, require a conviction or guilty plea, extend favorable settlement terms, 
and the like.49 
 
 
                                                      
49 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks of Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell, N.Y.U. 
School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement, Apr. 17, 2015; Compliance 





Corporate crime is an institutional problem.  Changing institutions requires 
changing the behavior of the people who control them.  With large corporations, 
those people are the senior managers.  There are many legal and non-legal 
instruments for influencing senior corporate managers, as the vastness of the field 
of corporate law attests.  Most of the time, however, the only such tool that 
involves criminal law is corporate criminal liability.  This is because individual 
criminal liability, in its basic structure, does not fit the problem of bad 
management that produces corporate crime.  Law could be reformed to create 
such fit only with radical changes that lie beyond likely current American 
consensus.  Meanwhile, corporate criminal liability as practiced in the federal 
system is an available—if not optimal, and certainly not yet optimized—tool for 
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